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RACE AND PROHIBITION MOVEMENTS
Brittany Arsiniega
Teresa Cosby
Spencer Richardson
Kylie Berube1
I.

INTRODUCTION

What do various prohibition movements in the United States have in
common? This article explores one apparent connection between opium, alcohol,
and marijuana prohibition movements in the United States: racism towards nonwhite people.
To a layperson, the basics of different prohibition movements may be
familiar. For example, alcohol prohibition (or, simply, Prohibition) resulted from
religious and temperance movements, the Anti-Saloon League, and women
standing up against the economic and moral wasteland that saloons represented for
their families.2 These are the stories commonly told and generally understood
within the American imagination. Missing from these familiar histories is an
understanding of the role, if any, that race and ethnicity played in the trajectory of
state and national alcohol prohibition movements between the end of the Civil War
and the passage of Prohibition. This paper serves as an exploratory journey into the
ways in which race impacted the movement for opium, alcohol, and marijuana –
especially in the American Midwest and South. From an examination of primary
and secondary sources, we find that we may underestimate this importance.
Existing literature often explores the prohibition movements surrounding
opium, cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana either individually or in comparison to one
another.3 This paper seeks to build a bridge—albeit a tiny one—through this body
of work. We strive to understand the impact that race played in the desire to have
prohibition in the first place and the racially disparate enforcement outcomes—
especially from the War on Drugs—that resulted.
This article starts with an overview of selective racialized drug legislation
and enforcement and their impacts on minority communities in the United States.
Section II explores the evolving understandings of historians over time regarding
1
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the motivations for Prohibition and the causes of its failure, and Section III
examines the opioid crisis in light of these lessons learned from the alcohol and
marijuana prohibition movements. Section IV discusses the racial motivations of
alcohol prohibitions in the 1900s and 1910s. Using a survey of newspaper articles
from The Atlanta Constitution during the first decade of the 20th century, we reveal
the alarming linkage between racism towards Black Americans and southern
advocacy for alcohol prohibition.4 We learn from these articles the framework for
understanding the intersection of alcohol prohibition and race, particularly in the
South. We also use case studies of Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, and North
Carolina during the Civil War and up to the passage of the 18th amendment.5
Section V examines how these same racial motivations carried over from alcohol
prohibition to the marijuana prohibition movement that jump-started immediately
after the passage of the 21st Amendment and the contemporary impact of these
efforts. Section VI concludes.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE IMPACTS OF SELECTIVE RACIALIZED LEGISLATION
AND ENFORCEMENT ON MINORITY COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

The modern prosecutor wields extensive power to criminalize or
decriminalize communities.6 In the 1930s, the Chicago School of Sociology
explored and claimed a nexus between criminal behavior and marginalized
communities of immigrants and African Americans.7 This connection between nonwhite communities and a presumed tendency towards lawbreaking has endured in
the public imagination.8 It took roughly another thirty years for scholars to
understand the problematic implications of this nexus.9 In the early 1960s, Kitsuse
and Cicourel argued that crime and deviance statistics are social products created
by social actors within organizations and institutions.10 They posited that crime
rates do not reflect some underlying reality of criminality but instead result from a
process of people calling certain behaviors deviant and counting them in crime
statistics.11 Their research implied that scholars should spend more time
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understanding the social construction of deviance rather than understanding
deviance through a positivist lens.12
Since the 1960s, criminologists, sociologists, and critical race scholars have
repeatedly identified an aspect of American policing that has persisted throughout
our country’s history: law enforcement officials disproportionately focus their
enforcement efforts on minorities, especially young men.13 With police attention
focused on non-white and poor people, less attention is directed to the enforcement
of white-collar or organized crimes committed by racial majorities.14
Scholars now understand that the over-policing of minority communities
dates back to America’s earliest days, including the policing of enslaved people,
Mexicans, and Native Americans.15 Indeed, many historical antecedents help
explain continued racial and class-based inequities in the American judicial
system.16
The criminal justice system’s overemphasis on the behavior of non-white
individuals continued with the war on drugs, where law enforcement officers have
routinely engaged in excessive and racially disparate enforcement practices.17 The
U.S. government has long viewed criminal law as an effective tool to deter the
production, distribution, and use of substances that the government deems illegal,
despite repeated research findings that the criminal code is ineffective in stemming
the demand for black market drugs.18 The futility of criminal laws to prevent drug
production and consumption is due to the social desirability of these compounds.19
This attraction persists despite the government’s official classification of such
substances.20 Mere criminalization of substances categorized as illicit does little to
stem such demand.21
Drug and alcohol consumption is racialized,22 extending to crack cocaine in
the 1990s, opium in the 19th century, and alcohol and marijuana in the 1920s and
1930s.23 Disparities in the treatment of minorities by majorities—including all
institutions of government, but especially law enforcement—have created an
12
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overrepresentation by the population of Black people in penal institutions compared
to white people.24 For instance, in 1918, Black people constituted only 11% of the
general population but 22% of the imprisoned.25 By 1960, Black people comprised
30% of the country’s prison population;26 by 1980, 44%;27 and by 1990, Black
people comprised fully half of the national prison population, despite making up
less than 15% of the country’s population at large.28 By 2001, the likelihood that a
Hispanic male would go to prison was 17%, compared to only 5.9% for white
males.29
The strong association of drugs with racial communities has created fertile
opportunities for stigma and criminalization.30 Still, scholars disagree as to the
cause of racial disparities in the criminal justice system. Some argue that
disproportionate numbers of arrests of Black and Latino people are due to elevated
levels of criminal behavior among those populations.31 Others suggest that
minorities are more likely to commit their offenses in public spaces; hence, their
illegal activities are more visible and facilitate police response.32 In contrast, white
people commit their crimes in more private venues.33 Some scholars take the view
that over-incarceration is attributable to structural defects in the system, not racial
bias.34 Recently, however, scholars, including Beckett et al., argue that some fault
lies with the legislative treatment of drugs—the government’s determination of
which substances should be made illegal in the first place.35 Those drugs associated
with minorities have been viewed by governmental majorities (and the public at
large) as more harmful or dangerous than those consumed by white people and
criminalized accordingly.36 Examples include crack cocaine versus powder cocaine
and consumption of opium by smoking (associated with Chinese immigrants)
versus oral consumption (associated with white people).37
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Scholars have established that certain laws are drafted because they are
inspired by a racial overcast that is discriminatory both in drafting and application.38
This framework better explains the overrepresentation of Black and Latino people
in drug possession arrests.39 Yet even when substances used by white people are
criminalized on the books, criminal law enforcement leaves a great deal of room
for discretion.40 This discretion creates additional space for racial disparities. The
argument that drug arrests are race-neutral (based only on the visibility of drug
activity and not on race) fails in the face of data demonstrating that more arrests are
made of Black and Latino people because law enforcement has focused
enforcement efforts on those drugs used by minorities, rather than those used more
frequently by white people.41 This fact represents a “racialized conception of ‘the
drug problem.’”42
America occupies a unique position in the Western world in that we have
the “world’s highest imprisonment rate, the Western world’s only use of capital
punishment, the Western world’s most severe punishments short of death, and the
effects of those policies on black Americans.”43 In this paper, we argue that these
effects extend to Latino communities and other racial and ethnic minorities. Those
prohibition movements are a vital tool used over time in the criminalization of
communities of color. We see prohibition movements, not as discrete moments in
our nation’s history, but intimately tied to one another. In the following sections,
we explore the alcohol prohibition movement and the marijuana prohibition
movement and apply lessons learned to the modern opioid crisis.
III.

RACE AND CRIMINALITY: AMERICA’S FIRST WAR ON DRUGS

In March 2011, the Batesville Herald-Tribune (Indiana) lamented the death
of 20-year-old Manda Spitler.44 “Manda was the best thing that ever happened in
my life, and even though Manda had two parents who loved her unconditionally,
had good friends, went to good schools, and had good teachers....she let the beast
of drug addiction take over her.”45 This style of reporting has become somewhat
characteristic of the so-called “opioid epidemic.” White victims are often
38
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memorialized fondly, with their bright futures lamented as needlessly lost, as poor
souls succumbed to some evil peer.46 Scholars have also noted that Black victims
are treated with less affection, their deaths reported matter-of-factly, or worse, as
the criminal bringers of their demise.47 Race has become inextricably linked to
criminality, especially in movements for substance prohibition.48 Examples of
disparate media reporting are not modern inventions, however.
We begin with this anecdote to show that this phenomenon finds its roots in
the earliest anti-drug campaign in American history: the push to ban smoking
opium at the end of the 19th century. When nineteen-year-old Albert Reggel died
from the side effects of smoking opium, the local paper dedicated a string of articles
to remembering the victim and denouncing the “evils of Chinese opium dens.”49
That journalistic gusto was not extended to the death of a Chinese railroad worker,
who also died from similar effects of opium consumption.50 No investigation into
his death was made, and no article was written to commemorate a life lost. 51
While the media reporting is obviously unequal, it is hardly the only theme
present during that period that made its way to succeeding generations. As we shall
see, the campaign against opium had little to do with opium but was a single wave
in a monsoon of anti-Chinese sentiment. The media and labor organizers decried
the Chinese as social villains, and the habit of smoking opium was an element of
their supposed inherent lawlessness.52 The actions of media, legislators, and
prominent Americans would not simply ignite the first war on drugs; they conspired
to develop the racially infused rhetoric employed by future prohibition advocates.
A. Golden Spikes and Gold in the River

46
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The mid-19th century witnessed an unprecedented rise in immigration to
the American West from Asia.53 Historians have typically attributed this
phenomenon to two major events: the discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill in 1848
and the construction of the Trans-Continental Railroad from 1865–1869.54 Many
of these immigrants arrived from the Chinese port city Canton, a historical hotbed
of international opium smuggling and political turmoil.55 In the twenty years from
1852–1870, over 70,000 Chinese workers flocked to the United States, often
working in the most dangerous jobs.56
Initially, Chinese immigrants were a welcome sight to fill labor shortages
arising from the gold rush.57 However, as time progressed, American sentiments of
“curiosity” devolved into “hatred espousing total exclusion.”58 When the gold rush
eventually lost popularity, and the railroad was completed, there was suddenly a
surplus of Chinese labor and no jobs needing filling.59 The lack of employment was
true across the country, but acutely so in San Francisco, one of the hardest-hit areas
in the country.60
To make matters direr for the immigrants, the United States plunged into
economic depression triggered by a major banking collapse four years after
completing the Transcontinental Railroad.61 The “Panic of 1873” was so
devastating; it was dubbed “the Great Depression” before the infamous stock
market collapse in 1929 took the title.62 Income plummeted, and unemployment
increased, with cities like New York seeing 25% unemployment in the first year.63
Railroad construction, often supported by now-failing banks, ceased.64
This economic turmoil fueled racial tensions between cheap Chinese
immigrant labor and white working-class labor.65 In some cases, Chinese laborers
53

See Gregory Yee Mark, Racial, Economic and Political Factors in the Development of
America’s First Drug Laws, 10 Issues in Criminology 49, 51 (1975) (detailing the immigration
landscape in the 19th century).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 59.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 56.
60
GREGORY A. AUSTIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCE USE 210
(1978).
61
ROBERT WHAPLES & RANDALL E. PARKER, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MAJOR EVENTS IN
ECONOMIC
HISTORY 21 (2013).
62
Scott Reynolds Nelson, The Real Great Depression, The Chronicle of Higher Education (2008).
63
See WHAPLES & PARKER, supra note 61, at 21.
64
Id.
65
Mark Kanazawa, Immigration, Exclusion, and Taxation: Anti-Chinese Legislation in Gold Rush
California, 65 J. OF ECON. HIST. 779, 780 (2005).

- 22 -

were preferred over their white counterparts because of the workers’ willingness to
endure long hours and earn lower wages.66 White people were all too eager to see
immigrants perform grueling railroad construction or fill the most dangerous
mining jobs.67 The fragile coexistence was quickly toppled when the economy
soured.68 Scholars have studied the intersection between economic interests and
Chinese immigration, concluding that anti-Chinese sentiment stemmed from the
perceived threat posed by Chinese laborers.69 Organized labor unions, responding
to labor shortages and the needs of their white members, spoke out against that
perceived threat. In 1877, the Workingman’s Party of California (WPC) was
founded in San Francisco by Dennis Kearney, an Irish immigrant.70 Kearney’s
WPC attacked the apparent enemies of the white working-class—the economic
elite and Chinese laborers.71 Throughout the late 1870s, the WPC campaigned for
the expulsion of the Chinese from California, evidenced in their motto, “The
Chinese Must Go.”72 In 1879, the WPC found political success, securing seats for
a California Constitutional Convention, which produced a constitution replete with
anti-Chinese articles.73
In 1886, the Knights of Labor led mobs against Chinese workers in Seattle,
Washington, expelling hundreds from the city.74 In Tacoma, the newly formed
“Workingman’s Union” expelled hundreds of Chinese, and fires burned down the
Chinese quarter of the city.75 And the anti-Chinese sentiment was not confined to
local incidents. Samuel Gompers penned Meat Vs. Rice, American Manhood
Against Asiatic Coolieism, Which Shall Survive? in 1902, evidencing continued
racism in organized labor.76 Gompers, famous as the decades-long leader of the
American Federation of Labor, hoped to inform the nation of the “Chinese menace”
which for so long had “absolutely doomed…the white laborer.”77 Economic despair
created a vacuum filled with xenophobia.78
The anti-Chinese scapegoating was not limited to labor groups; the media
also played on racist Chinese tropes. On March 10, 1873, still a full six months
66
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before the Panic hit, the San Francisco Chronicle ran a piece decrying Chinese
labor.79 According to the article, the large influx of Chinese laborers had “driven
white men, women, and children out of the factories to starve, be idle and
vicious.”80 The Tacoma Ledger also warned locals of “this gigantic invasion of
chinamen” who were coming to compete with white people for jobs.81 Amid the
economic fueled chaos, a new flavor of rhetoric bubbled: the link between race and
criminality. In what will become a theme of American prohibition laws for
generations, the Chinese are early victims of racialized criminality. This
racialization is realized with anti-opium laws. Initially, though, the media equated
the Chinese with illicit “heathen” behavior on many counts.82 The Chronicle and
Los Angeles Times both ran pieces identifying the “Heathen Chinese” as lawless,
unhygienic, and lazy.83 Another San Francisco paper hailed their Chinese residents
as “highbinders, prostitutes, and thieves.”84 In their reporting, the articles reflected
the prevalent attitudes of their readers. Anti-Asiatic Leagues began cropping up,
and Chinese citizens were the subject of public beatings, killings, and arsons across
the country.85
State governments responded to the growing negativity by passing laws
targeting Chinese residents. In 1853, a few years after California’s gold rush
brought Chinese miners to the American West Coast, California passed a Foreign
Miner’s License Tax which required monthly four-dollar payment by Chinese
miners.86 An 1859 law forbade Chinese miners from claims in Gold Hill, Nevada.87
Still, other laws enforced Chinese “Police Taxes,”88 requiring special licenses for
Chinese to hold fishing rights,89 and even demanded prisoners have their heads
shaved to their scalp.90 Shaving the scalp was especially pointed for Chinese
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immigrants; the loss of the braided queue hair was a sign of cultural humiliation.91
Many of these laws are overturned after successful court challenges; nonetheless,
they highlight the growing government response to anti-Chinese anxieties.92 In this
era, xenophobia went largely unchecked, and once it infiltrated the halls of
government, there was seldom recourse for the marginalized community.93
Furthermore, the legislation suggests a subconscious reinforcement that the
Chinese were lawless peoples, precisely as the papers suggested. The California
state legislature found the Chinese so “dangerous to the wellbeing” that the state
provided for removing them from the state altogether in 1880.94 National politicians
also began taking note. One Congressperson feared that if the state did not take
action to contain the Chinese, they would rise and “destroy our Christian nation.”95
Anti-Chinese fervor went from a regional to national hysteria, putting pressure on
politicians to pass restrictive legislation.96 In 1882, President Chester Arthur signed
the Chinese Exclusion Act, which barred most Chinese immigration to the United
States.97 The law was the first immigration bill that discriminated based on race or
ethnicity.98 Later legislation, like the Scott Act and Geary Act, prohibited Chinese
reentry unless certain property thresholds were met and required ChineseAmericans to carry internal passport papers to prove citizenship.99 This legislation
created an environment that allowed racialized drug laws to flourish. Undoubtedly,
each new piece of legislation bolstered the link between race and criminality. As
we will see, this latent link between race and crime would grow more robust and
pronounced with the criminalization of opium. While society was creating a de
facto racial hierarchy, the government was complicit in building one de jure.
Against this historical backdrop, the development of opium laws during this
period had little to do with the physical perils of drug use. The link between
criminality and race is established, and it joins forces with the criminalization of
opium. Anti-opium laws were merely another tool to restrict the Chinese in the
United States. As far as legislators were concerned, the dangers of opium did not
come from side effects of drug use; the danger is side effects of the races mixing.
B. The First War on Drugs
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Both racism and what would come to be called “pharmacological
Calvinism” launched America’s first war on drugs—white versus yellow, an image
of therapeutic drug use versus an image of self-indulgent pleasure seeking. The
public came to recognize two addicts, one a victim and the other a villain. The
former’s addiction was considered accidental, harmless, and deserving of pity. The
latter’s addiction was considered voluntary, dangerous, and a source of fear.
Addiction in the former was a disease; addiction in the latter was a vice. The former
was white; the latter was Chinese.100
Critically, the rhetoric surrounding addicted opium smokers and addicts
from prescription differed considerably. Prescribed opium derivatives, such as
morphine, were administered to Americans throughout the nineteenth century as a
pain reliever.101 And as a prescribed medicine, it was seemingly given a pass for
the deleterious effects it had on its users. And opium prescription was hardly a new
occurrence. During the American Civil War, opium was frequently doled out as a
post-battle pain reliever.102 Before 1900, dependence was most prevalent in upper
and middle classes, social castes dominated by white individuals.103 The most
common addict of medically prescribed morphine in this period was white
women.104 In an 1880 Chicago survey of opium addicts, over 70% of the
respondents were female.105 It has been hypothesized that many of these female
addicts, confined to housework, perhaps saw drug use as an escape from the sphere
of domesticity.106 Some scholars have cast the To Kill a Mockingbird character
“Mrs. Dubose” as the personification of 19th and 20th-century opium addiction.107
As a white, widowed, older woman addicted by her physician, the fictitious
character provides a strong caricature for medically prescribed opium addiction.108
Despite widespread use, this form of opium rarely had the criminal connotations
that smoking opium carried.109 The fact that prescribed opium carried the
imprimatur of a doctor’s signature made the addiction more palatable, even

100
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romanticized. Generally, there was no linkage between white opium addiction and
inherent deviant behavior.110
These facts do not support any argument that legislators did not criminalize
opium consumption; they did. Condemnation, however, was primarily confined to
smoking opium rather than addiction from prescription.111 The media and medical
community wasted no time warning the country of the evils of opium smoking.112
And early on in the reporting, the ills of opium smoking were linked to Chinese
immigrants.113 Part of the general lawless “heathen” stereotype attributed to the
Chinese was the “dope fiend” or opium addict.114 The term “dope fiend” entered
the American vocabulary in 1897, during anti-Chinese socio-political
development.115 The word “dope” itself even derives from a Dutch translation of
opium syrup.116 A highly regarded book on the subject titled Opium-Smoking in
America and China reported that smoking opium “is a fertile cause of crime, lying,
insanity, debt, and suicide.”117 Another suggested the Workingmen’s Party shift
focus away from labor competition to opium smoking, another fault to which “the
Chinese were working…the most harm.”118
Another newspaper agreed with the sentiment, stating the real danger of
Chinese immigration rested not in threats to job security but rather the proliferation
of opium usage, which hurt the “morals and health of the people.”119 In New York,
the Daily Tribune warned that opium “saps the moral strength and enfeebles the
will.”120 Even Gompers, in his racist 1902 manifesto, describes the “Opium Habit”
as evidence of Chinese moral depravity.121 In drawing a stark contrast between
opium addiction, one doctor noted that “medicinal opium was used because of
‘physical infirmity,’ whereas opium smoking was ‘instigated by moral
depravity.’”122 Included in “moral depravity” were beliefs that the drug bolstered
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users’ sexual appetites and led to prostitution and miscegenation.123 Some doctors
went so far as to call for a ban on opium smoking and Chinese immigration “to
preserve the purity of the race” from “amalgamation with inferior types.”124 This
sense of “moral depravity” amongst non-medicinal opium users only contributed
to public perception of Chinese inferiority.125 Public disapproval of opium smoking
had little to do with the dangers of addiction; the perceived dangers of racial mixing
engendered the disapproval.126 Chinese-operated opium dens became crude lairs
where these men lured lily-pure white people to their demise.127 And the media
eagerly printed out racially charged columns condemning the opium dens. A
Montana paper ran a story titled “Demonical Dens: Benton, the Victim of AlmondEyed Ministers of Satan.”128 Still, another reported that a group of Chinese men
were enticing “little girls to their dens for immoral purposes.”129
Because of the racial overtones and connection to moral depravity, opium
smokers became the antithesis of the upstanding American. Opium addiction made
one inherently less American. It was not long before this nationalist sentiment
turned into xenophobia against the Chinese. Now, opium prevented proper
assimilation into American society. A prominent physician of the time “believed
that opium acted as a barrier ‘to the spread of the true belief [Christianity] amongst
these Chinese people.’”130 Seen as the domain of an “inferior race,” opium smoking
and white Americanism were simply mutually exclusive.131 And yet, an interesting
phenomenon occurred around the mid-1870s—opium smoking began to spread to
the white middle and upper classes.132 Aghast, one physician noted that San
Francisco opium dens saw racial mixing between white and Chinese individuals.133
Another horrified missionary in Philadelphia feared white women cohabitating
with the Chinese in smoking lairs was “the first inducement to settle down to a life
of degradation.”134 Miscegenation was a palpable terror for onlookers. Mixing the
races had only one natural conclusion: the downfall of the white race and an end to
civilized society altogether.
As the link between the Chinese and the evils of opium grew more robust
and the habit began spreading to white communities, the political pressure to act
123

Id.
Id. at 49.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 56.
129
Id. See also Bonnie & Whitebread, infra note 391, at 984.
130
AHMAD, supra note 49, at 39.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
COURTWRIGHT, supra note 102, at 77.
134
Id.
124

- 28 -

swelled. Newspapers demanded action against opium smokers.135 In the mid-1870s,
public outcries to curtail opium smoking began sharply increasing, just as white
people began patronizing opium dens.136 “[A] heavy hand should be laid on them
[opium smokers], and their dissolute course checked for out of such materials
graduates the criminal element,” wrote one paper.137 Another article lamented that
white people were becoming “slaves to the habit” of opium smoking.138 “No
evil…can compare with that of opium-smoking…What are you going to do about
it?” asked a Montana paper.139 There is also evidence that newspapers strategically
placed anti-opium articles near articles about the “Chinese problem.”140 This
maneuver only served to subconsciously link opium to anti-Chinese sentiments,
though papers hardly had to make such an implicit claim—explicit ones were not
lacking.
Politicians responded to the anti-Chinese and anti-opium frenzy by passing
the nation’s first anti-drug ordinance.141 In 1875, the Board of Supervisors of the
City and County of San Francisco passed a law prohibiting the operation and visit
of opium dens.142 It read:
No person shall, in the city and county of San
Francisco, keep, or maintain, or become an inmate
of, or visit, or shall, in any way, contribute to the
support of any place, house, or room, where opium is
smoked, or where persons assemble for the purpose
of smoking opium or inhaling the fumes of opium.143
Punishable by fines ranging from $50 to $500 and up to six months in jail, the law
was the first anti-narcotics bill in American history.144 The law reflected the
disparate treatment of opium type: smoking vs. prescribed.145 San Francisco did not
prohibit doctors from prescribing opiates to patients but confined the law to
smoking dens.146 From the start, law enforcement did not equally enforce the law.147
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Opium dens frequented by white people were more likely to be raided, reflecting
fears of race-mixing.148
In many cases, the law also established a legitimate legal basis for overpolicing Chinese quarters in San Francisco.149 There is also considerable evidence
that the rules were designed not to punish white attendants of opium dens but rather
to harass Chinese operators.150 Other legislatures followed San Francisco’s suit;
Virginia City, Nevada, signed its law criminalizing opium in 1876.151 By 1914,
most states in the union had laws on the books penalizing the sale of opium or
operation of opium dens.152
Once anti-opium laws were passed, the link between race and criminality
was finally complete. Despite any façade of anti-drug rationale, there was no
question the legislation against opium had a more nefarious purpose: solve the
“Chinese problem.” For the white political establishment, eliminating opium meant
ridding the nation of Chinese immigrants who were the perceived antagonists of
the economic decline in the 1880s and 1890s.153 Even arbiters of justice were not
immune to the xenophobic fervor around anti-opium laws. For example, one
District Court in Oregon noted, “[T]his [anti-opium] legislation proceeds more
from a desire to vex the ‘Heathen Chinese’ than to protect the people from the evil
habit.”154 It was no secret then; anti-drug laws were not about addiction; they were
about race.
The laws failed to curb the spread of opium smoking.155 Newer, wealthier dens
cropped up and attracted patrons.156 Whenever the local government decided to
crack down on a particular location, white smokers merely took their business
where it was safe.157 This phenomenon caused a shift in anti-opium thinking. In
what would become another theme of American prohibition history, legislators
found a way to profit off the dens.158 San Francisco passed a new measure allowing
opium dens so long as the owners secured a license to operate.159 A 1909 bill passed
Congress which “prohibit[ed] the importation and use of opium for other than
medicinal purposes.”160 Again, the focus was placed acutely on non-prescription
148
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opium, a callback to unequal treatment in types of opium consumed.161 As a result
of the link to the Chinese, opium for smoking was targeted.162 Yet even this
legislation did little to prevent further addiction.163 Individuals addicted to opiates
merely sought out other sources to get their fix, like heroin.164 This demand
demonstrates the failure of legislators to address the root cause of the problem:
addiction. Further, it betrays race as the real reason propelling anti-opium
legislation. There were never programs developed to heal addicts, but rather the
legislation was simply another in a litany designed to target Chinese
communities.165 If there were ever any genuine concern for addiction, medicinal
opium would undoubtedly have earned the ire of the medical-legal community.166
Instead, no one was served. Chinese immigrants were brutally harassed and stripped
of their liberties, and white addicts continued to suffer the ills of chemical
dependence.167
When Lyndon Johnson signed the Immigration and Nationality Act of
168
1965, he effectively repealed forty years of American anti-Chinese immigration
policy. Standing at the foot of the Statue of Liberty, he hoped the bill would “repair
a very deep and painful flaw in the fabric of American justice.”169 Yet, the relics of
America’s anti-Chinese moment live on in the form of anti-drug rhetoric. The same
themes present during America’s first war on drugs most certainly still exist—
disparate treatment by race, type of drug, and the link between race and criminality
persist today. Crack and cocaine addiction have been historically treated radically
different in jurisprudence, despite being fundamentally the same narcotic. 170 This
disparate treatment bears a close resemblance to the unequal treatment of prescribed
opium and smoking opium addicts. Cleavages of race, class, and power all
determine the penalty for usage, not the drug itself.
IV.

ALCOHOL PROHIBITION
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Historians have long attempted to understand how Prohibition successfully
passed and why it ultimately failed. It is easy for those of us living in the 21st
century to take Prohibition’s failure for granted. After all, Prohibition lasted only
thirteen years,171 and we are now nearing a century since the passage of the 21st
Amendment, which brought the nationwide dry experiment to a close. But why was
alcohol prohibition ever successful in the first place? Explanations given vary
across time and discipline. Early writers like Charles Merz asserted that Prohibition
was a feat of politics: Congress simultaneously attempted to keep Wets happy,
bypassing the Amendment and Drys happy by refusing to enforce it.172 This refusal
to enforce, manifested through insufficient funding, resulted in Prohibition’s
failure.173 Later, historians like Norman Clark saw Prohibition not as a political
phenomenon but as the culmination of a social movement starting with the
country’s founding.174 Prohibition was then repealed not because it was a failed
policy but because the change the social movement sought was achieved. 175 Still
later, historians like Daniel Okrent and Lisa McGirr view Prohibition’s passage and
failure in a more sinister light, exposing the xenophobic and racist motivations for
the passing of the amendment and the highly selective enforcement against poor
Black and brown Americans once the amendment was in place.176 Only recently
have historians like McGirr begun to compare the selective enforcement and growth
in the penal and carceral state that resulted from Prohibition and leading ultimately
to the War on Drugs, mass incarceration, and continued selective policing of Black
and brown bodies the U.S. grapples with to this day.177
A. Histories of Prohibition
We will briefly explore four histories of Prohibition. The first, by Charles
Merz, was written before the 18th Amendment was repealed.178 The second history,
by Norman Clark, was written more than forty years later and offered a social
historian’s attempt to explain Prohibition’s passage and failure as the culmination
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of a social movement.179 Despite the significant advancement of time since the end
of Prohibition, Clark’s account does not explore the enduring effects of Prohibition
or the parallels to the war on drugs that, at the time Clark wrote, was just
beginning.180 In the third history, written in 2010, Daniel Okrent focuses his efforts
on providing a highly detailed account of the forces that joined together to result in
national Prohibition.181 His research reveals racial and nativist animus that
motivated Drys, offering more depth and regional analysis than either Merz or
Clark before him.182 It is not until the Fourth History, a 2016 book by Lisa McGirr,
that the long-term effects of Prohibition are explored.183 McGirr shows that the
same groups targeted by Prohibition enforcement continue to be the victims of
selective enforcement in the modern criminal justice system.184
i.

Charles Merz, The Dry Decade (1931)

Merz employed his skill as a newspaper editor to write a piece of investigative
journalism published while the 18th Amendment was still in force.185 He takes a
non-normative stand on the merits of Prohibition. Instead, he seeks to empirically
study it with what data was then available in Congressional records and the New
York Times, the two sources on which his report is almost exclusively based.186
Merz calls Prohibition an “experiment” made possible by a strong and
economically endowed lobby and the political climate of World War I.187 He posits
that this experiment was failing due to Congress and the President’s refusal to
appropriate sufficient funds to enforce the Amendment.188 For Merz, Prohibition
was problematic not for its social policy implications.189 It was a top-down
experiment and an example of elected officials trying to please too many people
simultaneously.190 Merz fails to see Prohibition as inextricably linked to the
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pervasive policing of “Americanism” before and during World War I.191 He also
fails to discuss the nuance and the intentionality of selective enforcement.192
Merz’s understanding of the Amendment’s failure is rooted in his
knowledge of its genesis during World War I.193 He asserts that the powerful AntiSaloon League (ASL) lobby used the War as an opportunity to push through their
bone-dry Amendment.194 Bone-drys had many reasons to feel hopeful in 1917: the
political and religious power of the ASL, increasing resentment nationwide against
saloons, lack of effective mobilization by breweries and distilleries, and lack of a
coherent movement supporting a more moderate reform.195 Ultimately, however, it
was the War that eventually tipped the scales.196 The war did three things for
prohibition: “it centralized authority in Washington; it stressed the importance of
saving food; and it outlawed all things, German.”197 Arriving on the floors of
Congress a mere three months after the declaration of war, Merz foreshadowed the
resolution’s victory from the start.198 Prohibition “would release large numbers of
men for the army, for shipbuilding and munitions work…[and] by shutting off grain
from the breweries and distilleries the country would save the equivalent of
11,000,000 loaves of bread a day.”199
Merz blames the War for shifting the American public’s attention away
from Prohibition and blames Congress for failing to give the Amendment teeth.200
Prohibition was failing because Congress and the President had not appropriated
enough funds to enforce it, not because of its more significant social implications
or any unbalanced way it was executed.201 The failure of the Amendment to achieve
its stated goals rested squarely on the shoulders of the executive and legislature (“a
dry majority which had at all times ample power to multiply its appropriations but
consistently refused to act”).202
Merz fails to delve deeper into which populations suffered from selective
enforcement. He aims to reveal a flaw in the political system, not to discuss more
significant implications of race and class divisions.203 The biggest problem for
Merz is not xenophobia, racism, or economic disparity, but self-interested
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politicians who wanted Drys off their backs without engendering too much
discontent among Wets by spending sufficient money on enforcement.204
Merz doesn’t ascribe Prohibition’s passage to nativist sentiment and doesn’t
see Prohibition as an example of the policing of Americanism that was otherwise
widespread during World War I (e.g., the 1917 Espionage Act and the 1918
Sedition Act).205 Rather than blaming nativist animus for the amendment’s passage,
Merz believes that the country was too distracted by war to care and that it was
voters’—and brewers’—inaction and preoccupation with War that allowed the
ASL to succeed in its dry mission.206 Neither does he characterize the Amendment
as federal overreach or a fundamental redefinition of the federal government's role,
as do later historians.207
Merz’s account lacks regional nuance in enforcement that later historians explore,
be it racially motivated southerners or nativist northeasterners. This lack of clarity
is mainly due to his reliance on federal Congressional records and the New York
Times rather than local newspapers or state legislative history.208 While Merz
acknowledges that Congress didn’t appropriate enough money to fully enforce,
thereby implicitly recognizing the resulting selective enforcement of the 18th
Amendment, he fails to discuss which populations were targeted most and hardest
hit by the little enforcement action that did take place.209 With the distance of time
and other approaches, later historians would delve deeper into Prohibition’s social
implications, racial motivations, and unequal enforcement.
ii.

Norman H. Clark, Deliver Us from Evil: An Interpretation of
American Prohibition (1976)

Clark seeks to explain the 18th Amendment not as a political incident whose
success depended on the occurrence of a World War but as the culmination of a
centuries-long process of social transformation that took place on the American
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continent, starting with Columbus.210 Clark finds the origins of the temperance
movement in the “disorder and chaos” of the 19th century.211
In the face of economic, spiritual, social, and geographic turmoil,
drunkenness became a social problem; temperance gained social force as a rational
reaction and attempted to “protect the values sheltered by the American nuclear
family.”212
Like his own earlier work,213 Clark seeks to place Prohibition in a larger
context of social change in the United States. Still, the influences of the “new
approaches” to social history are particularly prevalent in this work.
Unlike later historians who emphasize the racist motivations for
Prohibition’s passage and its selective enforcement, Clark repeatedly congratulates
those who promoted the temperance movement, comparing their efforts to mitigate
the social devastation and turmoil caused by drunkenness to earlier efforts of
abolitionists.214 The disorder of American life justified the moral anxieties of Drys,
and Clark compares the temperance movement’s ambitions to the campaign to rid
the country of racism and civil war:
The 18th Amendment was close in spirit to those
amendments which gave citizenship to former slaves
(and covered laws that might abolish racism),
allowed for a tax on incomes (and might help abolish
poverty) …and extended the franchise to women
(and might help toward the realization of true
democracy) …these were expressions of a lofty
idealism. They were reforms, not experiments.215
Rather than criticizing the political process that resulted in the passage of
Prohibition, the amendment was the culmination of a social revolution.216
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Clark acknowledges that the federal government wasn’t in a place to enforce
the amendment but defends the unenforceable amendment as a ceremonial act of
great significance.217
Far from addressing what later historians recognize as enforcement
selectively applied against minority groups, Clark continually praises Prohibition
and compares it to the Civil War amendments.218
Prohibition failed, Clark asserts, because values changed.219 This first
change in social values brought about Prohibition—and the second change in social
values repealed it.220 Once the social values inspiring Prohibition lost their function,
the natural course was to rid the country of the now unnecessary legal limitation on
the production, transportation, and sale of alcohol.221
Clark’s history of Prohibition offers a more sociological analysis than did
Merz’s, mainly due to the vastly different sources upon which he relied in crafting
his book and his training as a historian.222 His view that both the enactment and
repeal of Prohibition were the benign culmination of a social movement offers a
depth of analysis not available in earlier accounts of Prohibition written
contemporaneously to the amendment’s existence.223 Yet Clark’s version misses
the central critique of Prohibition featured in later histories: Prohibition’s more
sinister implications for federal overreach and selective enforcement targeting
immigrants and minorities.
iii.

Daniel Okrent, Last Call (2010)

Unlike Merz, Okrent writes with a dazzling array of 21st-century research
tools and sources. Okrent’s bibliography is 18 pages long, citing various sources
like newspapers, magazines, oral histories, and websites.224 He conducted original
interviews.225 He accessed archives, books, scholarly journal articles, dissertations,
and unpublished papers.226
Id. at 134. He argues that “[t]he most important thing about Prohibition to many people was to
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With the benefit of nearly eighty years of hindsight since Prohibition’s
repeal, Okrent seeks to explain “how the hell did it happen?”227 To answer this
question, he digs—as did Clark—into the history of drunkenness in the United
States and the social movements that advocated for Prohibition well before the 18th
Amendment’s passage.228 Okrent agrees with Clark that Prohibition was passed
mainly due to a war on alcohol raged by those, especially Protestants, who felt
besieged by rapid changes in the country.229 But he adds another layer of analysis
to Clark’s: racism and xenophobia.
While Clark implies that the nation was swept into a singular social
movement to oppose alcohol, Okrent notes that “five distinct, if occasionally
overlapping, components make up this unspoken coalition: racists, progressives,
suffragists, populists…and nativists.”230 Racists, particularly “across the southern
states in the resentful formation that had risen from the ruins of the Civil War,”
touted the “terrible condition of affairs that prevailed when swarms of negroes,
many of them drunk with whiskey…roamed the country at large.”231 Freed slaves
were brutes who could not have the tolerance for liquor and committed heinous
crimes while drunk. Many blamed the brewing industry, primarily occupied by
foreign-born, as responsible for debauching the Black man.232
In addition to racism, Okrent asserts that xenophobia drove Americans to
support the amendment.233 Americans who despised German and Irish immigrants
and their ways of life saw Prohibition as a means to force a change in their lifestyle
and to reduce immigrants’ political power.234 Teddy Roosevelt and his allies
detested the political culture of the Irish Democrats.235 Notably, the Ku Klux Klan
advocated for Prohibition as a means to suppress immigrants, Jews, and
Catholics.236
Okrent’s narrative paints a far darker picture than either Merz or Clark.
Merz critiques the political system, but his account does not reveal animus towards
particular subsets of society.237 Clark’s account is even more benign; Prohibition as
a social reform was the almost inevitable result of a relatively uniform, well227
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intended public resisting the chaos of rapid geographic, social, and cultural change
in the 19th century.238 Okrent’s detailed narrative exposes undertones missing from
both of these prior histories.239
The reasons Okrent cites for Prohibition’s failure largely echo Merz’s: a
legislature unwilling to allocate sufficient funds to adequately enforce the
amendment, mass flouting of the law, a plunge in government revenues, and public
health concerns after mass poisoning from bootleg liquor.240 Despite his
exhaustively researched account of Prohibition, which reveals much more nuance
to the national push for Prohibition, he fails to meaningfully address the selective
way in which the amendment was enforced when it was enforced at all. 241 This
deficit is where Lisa McGirr’s 2016 books help fill in the gap.
iv.

Lisa McGirr, The War on Alcohol: Prohibition and the Rise of the
American State (2016)

This recent book echoes severable sentiments of the three earlier accounts
of Prohibition discussed above but is the first to explicitly address the selective
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enforcement of Prohibition laws and the long-term significance of Prohibition,
especially for the poor and people of color.242 She sees Prohibition, not as an
experiment or an aberrational social movement, but the harbinger of a new age in
American criminal justice: “The government did not retreat from its new role in
crime control after the end of the war on alcohol. Its punitive approach to
recreational narcotics persisted and expanded in new directions, building on the
lessons learned from federal alcohol Prohibition.”243
Unlike Clark, who examined Prohibition as the culmination of decades (if
not centuries)-long social transformation, or Okrent, who wrote a captivating
narrative aimed at the general public, McGirr’s mission in this book is to establish,
through rigorous academic research, that Prohibition was the beginning of a new
era of federal control in the United States that led to a twentieth-century drug war
and mass incarceration.244
McGirr focuses her attention on the selective enforcement of Prohibition
and the long-term changes the amendment wrought.245 An entire chapter is titled
“Selective Enforcement.”246 She agrees that there was insufficient funding to
enforce the amendment fully but asserts that what funding did exist was
disproportionately directed towards policing the poor:
“Prohibition policing differed…most especially by
race, ethnicity, and class. An unprecedented
campaign of selective enforcement lurked beneath
the surface glamor of the roaring twenties…Uneven
enforcement was the hidden reason the white, urbane
upper-middle class could laugh at the antics of Izzy
Einstein and Moe Smith, while Mexicans, poor
European immigrants, African-Americans, poor
whites in the South, and the unlucky experienced the
full brunt of Prohibition enforcement’s deadly
reality.”247
Race played an essential role in the application of enforcement discretion. Using
Richmond, Virginia, as a case study, McGirr reiterates the ways that police officers
and prohibition agents specifically targeted people of color.248 This type of targeted
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police enforcement was nothing new for the African American community.249
African Americans had long suffered from legal codes applied selectively to control
their communities and coerce their labor: statutes against vagrancy, gambling, and
nuisance are examples that McGirr gives that had previously criminalized the
conduct of African Americans throughout the south.250 But African Americans
were not the only ones to suffer: Mexicans were targeted in Southern California,251
and immigrant communities were disproportionately arrested in Chicago, New
York, and Pittsburgh.252 The explanation falls time and again to money: fees
provided incentives to police departments to make arrests and collect fees, but those
of modest means cannot pay for protection or escape enforcement.253
McGirr’s discussion of selective enforcement against Black and brown
bodies resembles the public’s rising awareness of racial discretion in policing
highlighted by the Black Lives Matter movement.254 She relays a story from
Oklahoma City in 1931 when sheriff’s deputies shot and killed two Mexicans they
said were “bandits” running liquor but were actually students.255 “The local
deputies rapidly won an acquittal. . .”256 The story reads like the events in the
Michael Brown case; the unarmed Black teenager shot and killed by police near St.
Louis in 2014.257 A grand jury declined to indict the shooting officer.258 When
viewed through the lens of the Black Lives Matter movement, during which time
this book was written and published, Prohibition is an early and tragic example of
the disproportionate application of police violence against Black and brown bodies
in the United States.259
Prohibition, according to McGirr, fundamentally reshaped the prison
system, the courts, and criminal law doctrine.260 The adoption of stricter penalties
for violators created felony charges for someone purchasing a bottle and led to the
mass incarceration of the poor, which required the federal government to expand
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and reorganize the federal prison system.261 Federal courts, overburdened by a
docket they could not handle (22,000 cases were pending at the end of 1924), were
forced to improve efficiency through new procedural rules.262 Criminal law
doctrine changed rapidly as well, adopting plea bargaining and an expansion of
federal power: “justices like Taft, anxious to uphold the rule of law itself,
consistently decided in favor of the expansion of federal power.”263
These changes and expansions—of prisons, courts, and criminal law
doctrine—proved enduring, as “the challenge of alcohol Prohibition drew federal
officials into more aggressive narcotics enforcement of all kinds.”264 McGirr
believes that the logic of Prohibition, once made national law, hardened public
opinion towards mind-altering recreational substances generally.265 The years of
alcohol Prohibition left an imprint on the federal government, tilting it towards
policing, surveillance, and punishment.266 At the same time, Americans grew
accustomed to the notion that the federal government was responsible for resolving
social problems.267 The outcome was what McGirr calls a “second war on drugs.”268
McGirr closes her book by explicitly comparing Prohibition to the second
war on drugs.269 They share many features: large-scale national efforts to target
social problems, with backing from prominent thought-leaders.270 Notably, both
campaigns morphed into state-sanctioned selective enforcement: “the uneven racial
application of drug laws and discriminatory drug sentencing in some states of the
union has been so blatant that one human rights organization has reported Georgia
in violation of international agreements against racial discrimination.”271
More than any other author, McGirr seeks to use Prohibition to draw
parallels between 21st century policing and selective enforcement during
Prohibition.272
McGirr clarifies that Prohibition was the first war on drugs; the flawed
criminal justice system we have in the first decades of the 21st century 2021 is the
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result of the second.273 The outcomes of both are similar: selective enforcement
focused on Black and brown bodies. Yet McGirr believes that the second war has
even more drastic domestic and international consequences. 274 It is McGirr’s
version of Prohibition that most embodies the notion that history repeats itself, and
from which we can attempt to draw the most lessons for tackling the crisis of mass
incarceration and racialized enforcement of criminal laws that we face today.
B. Racial Motivations for Prohibition in the American South
In this section, we survey the Atlanta Constitution during the first decade of
the 20 century to reveal using primary sources the alarming ways in which Black
Americans are linked to southern advocacy for alcohol prohibition and derive from
these articles a basic framework for understanding the intersection of alcohol
prohibition and race, particularly in the south. We then dive deeper into this
intersection with an expanded scope, using the case studies of Alabama, Georgia,
Tennessee, and North Carolina during the period between the civil war and the
passage of the 18th amendment.
th

i.

Survey of the Atlanta Constitution, 1900-1910

Because we are explicitly interested in the intersection, if any, between race
and prohibition, we searched for articles containing both the keywords
“prohibition” and “negro.” We chose “negro” (rather than “colored,” “African
American,” or “Black”) based on an understanding of racial labeling used at the
time. This decision finds support in Tom Smith’s 1992 article in Public Opinions
Quarterly titled “Changing Racial Labels.”275 According to Smith, “colored” was
the dominant term in the United States until the mid-to-late 19th century, when
“negro” gained greater acceptance.276 By the beginning of the 20th century,
“colored” became viewed as too generic and took on an antiquated connotation,277
leading me to conclude that “negro” was the most appropriate search term. We
chose this time period because it encompasses a decade during which the nation
was in turmoil debating the alcohol question.278 This search returned myriad results,
273
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many unrelated to alcohol prohibition specifically. We sifted through dozens of
articles and found six relevant pieces spanning the first decade of the 20th century:
“Stinson on Prohibition,” August 1904: A black reverend, R. D.
Stinson, admonishes blacks to vote with whites in promoting local
prohibition laws, stating, “we have already cost the country millions
of dollars, much blood and sorrow, and if we have been moved from
slaves to freemen it means that we shall join in with the good people
in every nook and corner of this broad land for its betterment.”279
“Negro disenfranchisement discussed by W.H. Fleming,”
October 1905: Fleming, a Georgia attorney, wrote the piece
directed at white voters urging them to vote ‘nay’ on the proposed
amendment to the Georgia constitution requiring citizens, before
registering to vote, to “be able to read and explain to the satisfaction
of the board of registrars any paragraph of the state constitution.”
Fleming asserts that this is a “fraudulent administration of the law,”
explaining that “the officers of registration are to be white. An easy
paragraph for a white applicant, a difficult paragraph for a negro
applicant; the acceptance of any sort of explanation from a white
applicant, the rejection of any sort of explanation from a negro
applicant.” At first glance, this could be an enlightened attorney
raising consciousness around a discriminatory amendment. Yet his
advocacy takes a turn: “Nothing less than an impending overthrow
of white civilization by negro domination could excuse such
extreme measures. But every well informed and sensible man in
Georgia knows that we are not in danger of negro
domination…Every census shows that the margin of safety for white
supremacy is increasing…No one but a coward or demagogue is
that “the union of the temperance movement in the North with the anti-slavery forces was
detrimental to their interest...as the conflict between the pro-slavery people and the anti-slavery
people intensified, the temperance crusade in the South was drowned…and just prior to the war
the whole movement in the South collapsed.” (Walton, Jr. & Taylor, infra note 291, at 248). A
1931 account of prohibition in the confederacy by historian William Robinson reveals that prior to
the war, every southern plantation and farm had its “grape arbors” tended to by slaves. Robinson
posits that “the product of the black vintners compared favorably with the vintages of Bordeaux”
and ventures that any prohibition in the confederacy was the enforced product of wartime
conservation of grain, rather than a moral issue. See William Robinson, Jr., Prohibition in the
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afflict at present with any serious fears of negro domination in
Georgia, so long as the white people cooperate for white
supremacy.” He concludes the article by stating that “race
differences may justify and necessitate social distinctions, but race
differences cannot repeal the moral law.”280
“The Worst Enemies of Prohibition,” July 1908: This article
presents prohibition not primarily as a political issue but also as
racial. The unknown author posits that the voting divide is not
between republicans and democrats, but between white and black
citizens, stating that “prohibition owed its success to the votes of
democrats; for the republicans in Georgia—at least 95 per cent of
them negroes—always opposed it. It was not made a party measure.
The democrats did not support it as democrats, but as citizens. The
republicans did not oppose it as republicans. The negroes were
always controlled by the whisky element.”281
“Conniving at the Negro's Decadence,” February 1909: In the
fieriest and impassioned article from our sample, the unknown
author declares whisky and narcotics to be “the diabolical twins that
are, without the semblance of a rejoinder, destroying the producing
capacity of this child-people…. we did not discover that whisky was
the bane of the Indian until it had permanently subjugated the red
man. How long will it take us to discover that whisky and its deadlier
partner [cocaine] are sapping the life and foreclosing the future of a
race whose labor is fast slipping from beneath the control of the only
people qualified to intelligently and kindly direct it?”282
“Drink the White Man's Vice Under Southern Prohibition,”
January 1910: This article posits that Georgia’s prohibition law “is
doing what it was intended to do—protecting the negro,” although
it is being “administered by those who claim the right to violate it,”
namely, white men.283
“For Betterment of Negro Race,” June 1910: The article describes
a speech made by Seaborn Wright, a dry politician, tracing the
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importance of prohibition as a means of “uplifting” the colored race.
Wright quotes a letter written by an Atlanta judge, John L. Hopkins
(founder of the Atlanta Bar Association) that reads, “the greatest
problem of our day…is the making of citizens instead of criminals
out of the masses of the negroes that everywhere in the south eddy
and swirl in the body politic of the Anglo-Saxon.” Wright then
states, “If the negro is a criminal, we are to blame, for the negro will
be just what the white man makes him.” He cites the success of the
passage of Georgia's statewide prohibition in 1908 in decreasing
criminal behavior: “Crime among the negro population of Georgia
has decreased 50 per cent since the passing of the prohibition
law…as a result of the law the prison doors were open wide and the
prison empty.” No statistics are offered in support of this
conclusion.284
From this brief survey, we identified three critical takeaways that are crucial
when moving forward into an examination of other southern prohibition
movements. First, there is overwhelming evidence in Georgia of an important nexus
between race and that state’s movement for prohibition. Second, there was the vital
addition of the element of political power to this nexus. The articles repeatedly refer
to Black people’s political capacity as voters and their exercise of this voting power
to oppose prohibition. Underlying this is an assumption, largely unexplained and
unsupported by any empirical evidence, that nearly all Black people were wet. The
third takeaway is the emergence of a theme of continuing white control over Black
people’s voting and drinking habits despite emancipation. These themes manifest
themselves in a presumed inalienable difference between Black and White people.
In newspaper articles from the Prohibition era, Black people are presented as
malleable, inferior “child-people,”285 who “will be just what the white man makes
[them].”286 As “children,” they cannot self-regulate their alcohol intake and thus
are seen as easy prey for the liquor industry: “Negroes were always controlled by
the whisky element,”287 the same whisky element which threatened to “foreclose[e]
the future of a race whose labor is fast slipping from beneath the control of the only
people qualified to intelligently and kindly direct it.”288
ii.

Case Studies: Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and North Carolina

284

For Betterment of Negro Race, ATLANTA CONST., June 13, 1910, at 3.
The Worst Enemies of Prohibition, supra note 281.
286
Drink the White Man’s Vice Under Southern Prohibition, supra note 283.
287
Fleming, supra note 280.
288
The Worst Enemies of Prohibition, supra note 281.
285

- 46 -

Intrigued by the influential role that race played in Georgia during the
prohibition movement, we expanded our scope towards a review of secondary
sources, based largely on a 1971 article by Hanes Walton, Jr. and James E. Taylor
titled “Blacks and the Southern Prohibition Movement.”289 We also use more recent
works by Joe Coker (2007) and Daniel Okrent (2010).290 By briefly summarizing
the nexus of prohibition, race, and the right to vote in Alabama, Georgia,
Tennessee, and North Carolina, we then analyze what these realities signify and the
critical and alarming questions they bring forth.
a. Alabama
The intersection of race and prohibition dates back, not surprisingly, to
before the civil war, when Alabama law prohibited the sale of liquor to slaves.291
The freeing of slaves in Alabama and their newfound ability to drink legally caused
social upheaval, creating what James Benson Sellers calls a “fear of the drunken
black man” that “spurred the temperance people to take more vigorous measures to
promote prohibition.”292 In the decade after the war, Alabama’s Temperance
Movement Society withdrew from the National Grand Lodge after the national
body required Southern states to admit Black people to their membership.293 At an
1881 Temperance Convention, white attendees expressed discontent that liquor
prohibition in the South had been unsuccessful because “the ‘Whiskey power’ in
the state" controlled ”the ignorant colored vote.”294 Prohibitionists refused to form
their own state party out of fear that drawing support away from the Democratic
Party would be to open themselves to the possibility that Black people would
become “a balance-of-power factor.”295
Alabama’s prohibitionists blamed Black people for the failure of local option
laws.296 In retribution, Prohibitionists joined Democrats in advocating for the
constructive disenfranchisement of Black people.297 Disenfranchisement came to
fruition in 1893 with the passage of a secret ballot law, drastically diminishing the
Black vote by forcing Black people to enter the voting booth alone without
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assistance from party operatives.298 Ballots listed only candidate names and not
party affiliations.299 Alabama further held a constitutional convention in 1901,
resulting in poll taxes, literacy tests, and residency requirements.300 The result
reduced the number of eligible Black voters in the state from 181,000 to less than
3,000.301
Upon effectively removing Black people from the political arena,
prohibitionists enacted a state-run dispensary system, calling this “the best way to
keep Blacks from consuming liquor.”302 After the turn of the 20th century,
prohibitionists succeeded in passing additional legislation to protect the white
population by restraining Black people from consuming alcohol.303 Coker relates
that with disenfranchisement in effect,
People’s attention could be drawn away from the power of
the black man’s vote, they could with greater patience work
upon the solution of the real problem…whites and Negroes
could now join hands to protect the ignorant black man from
the evils of intemperance, and to safeguard the white man
and white woman from the violence of the liquor-crazed
black.304
From this narrative, it is unclear if, in the absence of a Black population that
needed “controlling,” the prohibition movement in Alabama would have existed at
all.305 Coker suggests that the prohibition movement may have existed
independently of race but that the need to control the sale of liquor to irresponsible
black men” became the genuine battle cry of the post-war temperance movement.306
Thus, a double motive of both restraining Black people and protecting white people
is what carried the temperance movement.307
However, when forced to choose between race and booze, Daniel Okrent
relates that for white Alabamans, “race trumped booze.”308 In a 1914 Democratic
primary for a vacant state senate seat, a Prohibitionist with progressive views on
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race lost to a wet because “as much as white Alabamans cared about the liquor
question, they cared more about the race question.”309 They feared that the former’s
views on race would lead “unacceptably to the national enfranchisement of the
Negro.”310 Thus, when forced to choose between two senators, one tough on booze
and another tough on Black people, white voters revealed that maintaining a
disempowered Black population was more important.311 This choice suggests that
passing prohibition legislation may not have been white Alabamian’s highest goal
but instead was used to justify disenfranchisement.
b. Georgia
The post-war period in Georgia witnessed a revitalization in the temperance
movement led by a local optimist, Hoke Smith.312 During the 1880s and 90s, he
subscribed to a philosophy that Walton, Jr., and Taylor call “tolerant white
paternalism,” and in 1899, Smith spoke up against disenfranchisement.313
However, he changed his tune in 1905 by adding disenfranchisement to his platform
when running for governor.314 During his campaign, he announced that Black
people “were better laborers and citizens when they were out of politics” and that
“the Black vote was corrupt and purchasable by the liquor interest.”315 Although
his opponent, Clark Howell, tried to minimize Smith’s appeal to white voters, Smith
won the election because he “linked prohibition and disenfranchisement. 316 The
combination of the liquor interest and Negroes threatened white civilization in
Georgia.”317 Poll taxes enacted in the 1880s and a 1900 mandate for all-white
primaries had already severely limited Black participation in politics.318
Nonetheless, Smith worked to secure total disenfranchisement via
constitutional amendment upon taking office.319 Signed in 1907, the amendment
was ratified by voters in 1908, and it reportedly removed 90% of Black voters from
the ballot box.320 He waited until disenfranchisement was ratified to present a
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prohibition law, believing that “before prohibition could be sought, Blacks had to
be removed from the political arena.”321
Okrent calls the rhetoric surrounding African Americans in Georgia “toxic,”
citing a 1907 article from The Atlanta Constitution that lamented the “terrible
condition of affairs” arising when “negroes, many of them drunk with whisky,
roamed the country at large.”322 A survey of that newspaper reveals that even after
the nearly complete disenfranchisement of Black people through constitutional
amendment, a public discourse surrounding the need to control Black access to
liquor continued to exist.
c. Tennessee
As in Alabama, Tennessee had strict laws prohibiting the sale of intoxicants
to free Black people and slaves.323 In the post-war revival of the temperance
movement in Tennessee, Black people were actively involved on both sides of the
issue.324 However, after an 1887 vote to dry up the state failed, people were quick
to blame Black communities.325 The pro-prohibitionist Nashville American quickly
asserted that 90,000 of the 145,000 votes cast against the amendment were those of
Black people and that “whites who had voted for prohibition were defeated by
Blacks under the influences of money, liquor, and the appeal to prejudice.”326 It
continued, “If progressive movements were to succeed within the state, and if the
state was to have viable reform politics, the Blacks would have to be excluded from
political life.”327 Tennessee, like its southern neighbors, moved quickly to achieve
such exclusion.328 Having failed to persuade Black voters, explains Okrent, “the
drys chose instead to demonize. They conjured not an argument but an image: the
waking nightmare of a Black man with a bottle of whiskey in one hand and a ballot
in the other.”329 This demonization succeeded in convincing the white majority, and
in 1889, the legislature implemented a poll tax, voter registration restrictions, and
secret ballot with the express purpose of restricting the Black vote.330 The secret
ballot law, called the Dortch law, contained a grandfather clause allowing those
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who had been eligible to vote in 1857 to continue to receive assistance in the ballot
box, thereby creating an exception for uneducated white voters.331
Prohibitionists backed the total disenfranchisement of Black people in
332
1909. In 1890, Tennessee evangelicals increasingly promoted prohibition as the
principal remedy for the region's racial strife.333 O.P. Fitzgerald, coeditor of
Nashville's Christian Advocate, argued that “of the so-called race troubles in the
South, whisky has been the cause of almost every case.”334
d. North Carolina
Before the Civil War, neither free Black people nor slaves could buy liquor
in North Carolina.335 White people became alarmed after emancipation gave Black
individuals the freedom to drink and believed that “Blacks had taken advantage of
their new freedom and often drank to an excess… Besides, liquor gave Blacks a
feeling of being equal or even superior to white, an attitude which could not be
tolerated.”336 When prohibition efforts failed in numerous elections, Black people
were blamed: “On the assumption that if Blacks were barred from voting total
statewide prohibition could be achieved, the prohibitionists pleaded that Blacks be
disenfranchised.”337 Here, too, they succeeded: Black disenfranchisement passed in
1900, praised by one North Carolinian Presbyterian minister for removing “the
shadow of Negro domination.”338 Yet even with Black people politically
decapitated, prohibitionists continued to push through local option laws to limit
Black people’s ability to access alcohol.339
Like other southern states, the public discourse in North Carolina blurred
the lines between anger over Black voters’ ability to influence prohibition vote
outcomes, fear of the implication that this vote had for the potential “Black
domination” of white people, and scientifically unfounded assertions that Black
people under the influence of alcohol were a menace to society.
iii.

Synthesizing Case Studies into a Holistic View of Race and Prohibition

Having established that race did indeed play an important, if not crucial,
role in the prohibition movements of southern states recovering from the Civil War,
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we turn to a discussion of areas that merit additional examination. First, we explore
the domination of two metaphors in the public discourse surrounding Black people:
the “wild animal” metaphor and the “child” metaphor, both damning but notably
distinct. We then examine the questions left open by current literature regarding
Black voters’ role in the voting arena. Finally, we look at the treatment of Black
people in a larger context of fear of anything deemed “foreign” or “other.”
iv.

Wild Animal Metaphor

The movement for alcohol prohibition was dominated by two distinct
metaphors used repeatedly in public discourse to convince white voters to support
both prohibition and disenfranchisement legislation. The “wild animal” metaphor
is evident through the repeated use of imagery of wild animals and animal
movement. In newspapers and speeches, Black people were repeatedly called
“brutes” and “beasts,” both sober and under the influence of alcohol.340 We can
recall the Atlanta Constitution article previously discussed, which referred to
“swarms” of Black people who “roamed” the country at large.341 Coker describes
how southern white people, particularly evangelicals, played on a popular image of
the “black beast” when proclaiming that alcohol was the central ingredient in the
perceived degradation of Black males.342 The proliferation of cheap “Black Cock
Vigor Gin,” marketed to poor southern Black individuals, featured a nearly nude
white woman on the label.343 This labeling exacerbated tensions and led a white
Nashville clergyman to conclude that “this gin, with its label…is sold with the
promise that it will bring white virtue into the black brute’s power.”344 In this vein,
concurrent to the prohibition movement was a hysteria the swept through the South
in the early 1900s over Black “brutes” raping white women.345 Just as wild animals
are unpredictable and untamed, so too did white prohibitionists declare Black
people to be “a menace to life, property, and the repose of the community” when
drunk.346 Ultimately, Prohibition in the south was ratified as the solution to “black
savagery.”347
Missing from these public accusations are actual statistical or factual
allegations. Those employing this rhetoric relied on powerful imagery rather than
references to reality, playing on innate and instinctual fears to falsely activate
defense mechanisms in white voters. This terminology frames Black individuals as
340

Id.
Id.
342
COKER, supra note 299, at 124.
343
OKRENT, supra note 176, at 46.
344
Id.
345
COKER, supra note 299, at 124.
346
Walton, Jr. & Taylor, supra note 291, at 247.
347
COKER, supra note 299, at 124.
341

- 52 -

uncontrollable criminals and seeks to convey a propensity of alcohol to unleash a
beast. Prohibitionists’ use of negative stereotypes further dehumanized Black
people, treating them as a species apart rather than as fellow citizens of the New
South. To call Black people “beasts” is to preclude their ability to make rational
and informed decisions. By invoking powerful images of wild, untamed,
carnivorous creates, white southerners were allowed to feel justified in maintaining
and perpetuating the steadfast segregation that slavery had permitted. Such
terminology was not an invention of the prohibition movement, yet the tendency
by prohibitionists to employ it as a means of furthering their agenda demonstrates
the minimal progress that had been made to improve antebellum race relations. Did
the use of this graphic and violent imagery stem from real, although grossly
misinformed, fear by white people that Black people were somehow biologically
incapable of consuming liquor? Or was it an intentional top-down fabrication by
the Southern elite resentfully clinging to the status quo and refusing to accept any
sense of equality with which access to alcohol empowered Black people?
v.

Child Metaphor

In southern prohibitionist rhetoric, we see the use of a second metaphor: the
“helpless child.”348 Coker describes an image that developed in antebellum years
of “slaves as simplistic, childlike creatures.”349 He asserts that “Southern writers,
politicians, and preachers increasingly portrayed African Americans as childlike
creatures who must be protected and parented by white men—the ‘adults’ in
society, as it were—for their good.”350 Those employing this rhetoric tended to be
less overtly racist but still viewed Black people as incapable of controlling
themselves, given the newfound freedom to purchase and consume alcohol. Coker
further notes that by the late 1890s, the push for Black education had been replaced
in the South by condescending paternalism.351 In the articles surveyed in Section 1
of this essay, we repeatedly see the patronizing need that many white individuals
projected to “protect” African Americans given that “they developed no high
degree of ability to resist” the evil effects of the alcohol from which they were
protected under slavery.352 Shouldered with the responsibility to “protect” Black
people from themselves, it was a betrayal of this duty to permit alcohol sales to that
segment of society unable to handle it.353 Many prohibitionists proclaimed, the
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“negro will be just what the white man makes him.”354 Like parents hiding liquor
in a liquor cabinet, southerners employing this rhetoric may have viewed
prohibition as “a way to keep liquor away from blacks but allow whites to get it.”355
Those using this paternalistic language considered disenfranchisement and
prohibition as necessary and morally justified; after all, young children are not
permitted to vote or buy whiskey, on the theory that they are unable to handle either.
Only upon eliminating Black voters from the political arena could the “adults” then
pass legislation in everyone’s best interest.
The interplay of the “wild animal” and “helpless child” metaphors was
damning for Southern Black communities, who not only lost their right to vote in
many southern states but also lost their right to buy liquor.356 It is likely that these
Prohibition-era images of drunken, reckless Black men promoted by white
southerners were holdovers from antebellum race relations and simply repurposed
to push a prohibitionist and disenfranchisement agenda.
vi.

Black Communities and the Right to Vote

Our investigation highlighted the startling reality that prohibition
movements played an integral role in Black disenfranchisement after the Civil War.
Coker reveals a fascinating history of “New Southites,” many of them white
southern evangelicals who professed to have realized the folly of slavery.357 During
the 1870s and 80s, many “New Southites” publicly declared that slavery had
hindered the South economically and tainted it morally.358 Coker goes as far as
saying that “the attitude of New Southites towards blacks was one of optimism and
confidence. They said good riddance to slavery and welcomed universal male
suffrage.”359 Yet by the 1890s, these same white southern evangelists had begun
advertising “that the burden of suffrage might be too great for African Americans
to bear.”360 They proclaimed that the power to vote had been “thrust upon”
freedmen who had proven themselves “manifestly disqualified to perform the
duties of electors.”361
The proclamation that Black people were unfit to vote conceals what we
believe was genuinely happening. For the first time in American history, a minority
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had sufficient voting power to be outcome determinative in southern elections.362
Black voters could act as a swing vote, something never before witnessed in the
racially binary south.363 The issue of prohibition may have represented the first
ballot initiative in southern states whose outcome rested mainly on how Black
individuals voted. Coker would agree that southerners, who once accepted the postwar enfranchisement of Black people, shifted to supporting disenfranchisement
when they realized “that black voters would not support prohibition.”364 What is
lacking from the existing literature is a meaningful empirical examination into the
truthfulness of the presumed “black voting bloc” surrounding prohibition, perhaps
because such voting data is unavailable. If procurable, voting information would
reveal if Black voters were a swing vote on prohibition legislation. If that is the
case, the argument can be made that prohibition was the white majority’s highest
goal. Black disenfranchisement was merely a means to achieve prohibition because
white voters correctly surmised that legislation would not be passed unless Black
people were prevented from voting. However, if Black voters were not a swing
vote, disenfranchisement may be purely a means of social control and reversion to
the antebellum status quo.
Sadly, white voters in the South viewed Black people as unfit to enjoy two
freedoms recently conferred upon them by emancipation: the rights to vote and
purchase alcohol. The abolishment of slavery undeniably brought shocking changes
to the lives of both freed slaves and white individuals in the South. But, instead of
investing energy in incorporating the newly franchised Black population into civic
life, white prohibitionists instead focused their efforts on continuing to deny
benefits to freedmen; these included benefits of civic participation and participation
in recreational socialization through alcohol consumption.
vii.

Fear of the “Other”

It was not just Black people that white southerners despised. Okrent notes
that southerners were xenophobic in general, likely because “in some Southern
states the population was as much as 99 percent native stock.”365 The ethnic
diversity of San Francisco, New York, and Chicago was largely absent in the South
during Reconstruction, and Southern society continued to be predominantly racially
binary, leading to a lack of familiarity with any “other” besides the Black people,
who had until so recently been enslaved.366
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This xenophobia of all non-white people was visible in the first iteration of
the modern Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”), which focused its hatred on Jewish and
Catholic immigrants; it was only later reincarnations of the KKK that transitioned
its “venomous loathing on black people.”367 Jewish distillers were accused of
debauching the Black man; when Congressman John Tillman said that he “wished
to save the Negro from lynching by denying him his liquor,” he stated that in so
doing, he was not hurting southerners.368 “I am not attacking an American
institution. I am attacking mainly a foreign enterprise.”369 In a 2011 study, Colin
Trujillo describes prohibition movements as the racist attempt to suppress German
and Irish immigrants.370 On a national scale, then, Southerners-against-Blacks is
not the only manifestation of racial motivations for prohibition.371 Yet, an
examination of the way white southerners discussed and treated Black people can
be used as a benchmark to examine, with an expanded scope, the demeaning and
dehumanizing ways in which Americans have often treated those considered
“different” or “foreign.”
No matter how the above story is read, it is ultimately a question of a
majority seeking to control a minority whose voting power was feared. The desire
to control a child and the desire to control a savage beast, while somewhat distinct,
are still about exerting domination over the body of another. Former Confederate
states lost the ability to exercise this control through forced labor under slavery but
continued to exert authority by other means.372
Prohibition is often regarded as a strange blip on the radar of America’s
past. The prohibition-motivated disenfranchisement of Black communities and
even the local and national prohibition legislation that followed were, in hindsight,
temporary. But prohibition stands for something much more significant: the first
instance in which southern white voters faced a franchised minority with sufficient
power to be a swing vote. Their reaction and the extent to which they were willing
to pass disenfranchising legislation to prevent such a swing vote are alarming.
The demonization and dehumanization of those considered “other” and
“foreign” present in white prohibitionist rhetoric in the south, unfortunately, did not
end with the enactment of the 18th Amendment, nor with its repeal, nor with the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.
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V.

MARIJUANA PROHIBITION

On December 4th, 2020, the United States House of Representatives voted
in favor of a historic bill to federally decriminalize marijuana and expunge all
previous marijuana possession convictions.373 In 2017, “more than one in five U.S.
adults live in a state where they can walk into a store to purchase recreational
marijuana.”374 Public opinion on marijuana has drastically shifted in the last 40
years.375 Understanding this change in public opinion requires evaluating why
governments criminalized marijuana, the effects of marijuana criminalization on
minority communities, and how public opinion has, or perhaps has not, influenced
these policies.
A. History of Marijuana Criminalization
Though associated since the mid-20 century with Mexicans, the marijuana
plant is not indigenous to Mexico.376 Asians were the first to cultivate marijuana;
the name marijuana comes from the Spanish word for intoxication.377 Marijuana’s
relationship with Mexico is attributable to the Spanish importation of the plant into
the New World.378 Spain mandated its cultivation, and this command was supported
by influential international and local personnel in Mexico.379 There are multiple
theories as to the reasons for marijuana criminalization. The first theory is that the
373
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negative public view of marijuana, specifically the use of marijuana by minority
groups, was the driving force for marijuana criminalization.380 The “Mexican
hypothesis” posits that marijuana use became heavily associated with the Mexican
immigrant community; this association led to the racialization of marijuana, fueling
negative public opinions around the drug.381 This negativity resulted in a societal
push for criminalization.382 The racialization of marijuana also contributed to the
narrative of marijuana being a harmful drug that “caused madness, crime, and
violence among its users.”383 Additionally, recent studies demonstrate that
“marijuana use was not widespread” among Mexican immigrant communities and,
instead, Mexican immigrants generally became associated with crime, but not
specifically marijuana consumption.384 While public opinion may not have
specifically targeted marijuana use among Mexicans, it is vital to recognize the
effects of “moral entrepreneurs” on the marijuana criminalization movement.385
The term “moral entrepreneurs” “refers to individuals who use the strength
of their positions to encourage others to follow their moral stance.”386 While there
may not have been a widespread negative public opinion about marijuana use in
minority communities, moral entrepreneurs did racialize marijuana. They then
commodified the racialization of the drug to advocate for its prohibition.387
Marijuana prohibition started in California to address public concerns about
the use of marijuana by non-white ethnic groups and the threats to white youth.388
This concern arose before marijuana became federally illegal in 1937 after
California prohibited the use and possession of the drug.389 Also, Mexican
immigrants were not the only ones this movement targeted, as marijuana was
“thought to appeal to the ‘oriental mind,’” and the use of opium by east Asian
immigrants helped contribute to the narrative that marijuana use resulted in crime
and laziness.390
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Unlike alcohol prohibition, which lasted barely more than a decade, laws
criminalizing marijuana have remained in effect since the turn of the 20th century.
Marijuana legislation is inspired by racialized campaigns to criminalize the nonmedical use of opium.391 The language of an Oregon district court reflects this
animus after the conviction of a Chinese man for distribution of the drug. Smoking
opium is not our vice, and therefore it may be that this legislation proceeds more
from a desire to vex and annoy the “Heathen Chinee” in this respect, than to protect
the people from the evil habit. But the motives of legislators cannot be the subject
of judicial investigation for the purpose of affecting the validity of their acts.392
Similar to how moral entrepreneurs created moral panic surrounding the use
of marijuana in California, Henry Jacob Anslinger, an official for the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, was uniquely positioned to benefit from the authority to
enforce marijuana prohibition and led the effort to have marijuana criminalized at
the federal level.393 Public prejudice against “Hindoos and Mexicans” was
weaponized by these moral entrepreneurs to racialize marijuana, resulting in
negative public opinion about the drug.394 It is important to reemphasize that there
is little to no evidence that marijuana laws were “rooted in public outcry or
demand;” instead, the criminalization efforts were primarily the focus of political
operatives and private entities.395 While public opinion itself may not have
contributed to the criminalization of marijuana, the moral panic fostered by antimarijuana political figures negatively impacted public opinion surrounding
marijuana, and this view of marijuana is still prevalent.396 The rhetoric of moral
entrepreneurs and their success in prohibiting marijuana ownership, distribution
and use, not only had a significant lasting effect on public opinion, but it has posed
an uphill battle for members of minority groups.
In the United States, the use of marijuana dates as far back as the 19th
century.397 Richard Bonnie and Charles Whitebread’s work has been significant in
constructing the discursive context of the movement to criminalize marijuana.398
They report that criminal penalties began in the 1920s, and attention to the drug
was directly related to public discourse on alcohol prohibition.399 Before the 1900s,
391
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there was no prohibition of any type of marijuana use; by 1914, legislation was
passed in every state.400
Unlike the Temperance movement, which involved extensive public
engagement on whether to criminalize alcohol, the rhetorical justification for the
ad hoc anti-narcotics movement was to anticipate the evils of narcotics use and
avoid those evils.401 The dialogue around marijuana focused on the corruption
produced by the drug, which allegedly included crime, poverty, and mental
illness.402 At the beginning of the marijuana prohibition movement, only 1% of the
population was addicted to any type of drug, including marijuana.403 Its use was
concentrated among the middle-class.404 Addiction was attributed to medical
intervention through careless over-prescription by doctors (a phenomenon that
would foreshadow the current opioid crisis).405 Early legislative efforts targeted
crime prevention and a public education campaign to warn against the dangers of
the drug.406
The first national policy addressing marijuana occurred in 1932, in the
waning years of Prohibition.407 The story that is widely told regarding the
motivation for the legislative movement was public concern about the problems
associated with narcotics use.408 Narcotics addicts were labeled “dope fiends,” and
media accounts of drug use were sensationalized and dissected from the medical
justification for use.409
Marijuana use gained national attention in the 1930s, drawing the public’s
focus after the repeal of Prohibition.410 However, in reality, early marijuana laws
were a continuation of attempts by a white majority to control a non-white minority.
In the case of marijuana, laws were aimed at subduing a growing Mexican
population. This population had skyrocketed after the United States acquired half
of Mexico’s territory in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) that ended the
Mexican American War.411
Bonnie and Whitebread outline three factors that influenced the treatment
of marijuana in the 1930s: racial prejudice (which they argue was the most
400
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prominent); the assumption that marijuana was an addictive drug; and Mexican
immigration.412 This focus combined racial animus with nativist prejudice.413 This
hatred explains why the legislative movement was regional. Western and southern
states with more prominent Mexican and African American populations were the
most active in advancing this legislation.414
Proponents of the legislative movement strongly relied on racial prejudice
to support their arguments. Mexican Americans and immigrants became the face of
the marijuana drug epidemic.415 This finding is supported by the works of other
scholars who argue that once the need for Mexican agricultural workers subsided,
anti-marijuana campaigns functioned as a mechanism to argue for their exclusion
from the American labor market.416 Movement participants made these assertions
despite the absence of facts substantiating allegations that the drug was used at a
high rate in Mexican communities.417 Instead, a survey of police reports reveals that
alcohol and gambling were the more significant problems in these communities.418
Nevertheless, the campaign against Mexicans was marked by “passion and race
hatred” that disregarded facts about the social harms their communities suffered.419
In other words, marijuana use was not seen as a problem, nor the target of public
policy, until the movement to control its use was racialized.420
In the 1920 and 30s, media and government agents started associating the
drugs with Mexicans as a mechanism to pass legislation prohibiting its cultivation
and use.421 The initial subjects of this focus were youth, then white prostitutes,
gamblers, pimps, “hop heads (drug addicts),” low-class white people, East Indians,
Black people, chauffeurs, and “hangers on of the underworld.”422
Valdez and Kaplan argue that to understand the racial motivations for
marijuana prohibition, one must first understand how race works in concert with
other complex factors.423 They embrace a criminological frame to explain how the
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“intersection of race, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity, the dangerous social
classes, influenced the emergence of controls on marijuana and other illicit
drugs.”424
To document their findings, Bonnie and Whitebread point to western
newspapers in Montana and Colorado. A Montana newspaper reported that
“Marihuana is Mexican opium, a plant used by Mexicans and cultivated for sale by
Indians.”425 A Colorado newspaper reported on a white girl murdered by her
Mexican stepfather.426 The paper alleged that the father might have been a
marijuana user.427 The paper’s headline was “Fiend Slayer Caught in Nebraska[;]
Mexican Confesses Torture of American Baby, Prisoner Admits to Officer He is
Marihuana Addict.”428 Bonnie and Whitebread conclude that the affiliation of
marijuana use with Mexicans was sufficient to justify its prohibition, which also
explains the sensationalizing of the drug's effect.429
Bonnie and Whitebread’s accounts closely track a state-level examination
of marijuana use in New Orleans by Vyhnanek.430 The drug was trafficked to New
Orleans by distributors in New York; New Orleans was the primary drug
distribution center in the south.431 The drug was easily accessible to poor children
because they could purchase two cigarettes for a quarter.432 The drug’s introduction
to the New Orleans scene promoted exaggerations about its dangers, including the
threat of death.433 These exaggerations were supported by the pharmaceutical
industry, which included allegations that the drug leads to addiction to more
dangerous drugs.434 The New Orleans press took up the charges claiming that
abusers could purchase drugs as easily as you would buy a sandwich.435 The stories
about the drug evidenced the first major press coverage on marijuana and its
effects.436 This coverage also fermented a growing interest in marijuana
legislation437 Newspaper writers and editors did not engage in anti-Mexican
arguments to demonize the drug; instead, they talked about “scarlet women” and
“society belles.”438 Louisiana eventually passed legislation criminalizing
424
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marijuana; illegal users faced a fine of up to $500.00 and six months in prison for
possessing the drug.439
The criminalization of marijuana cannot be dislodged from its racial
overtones. The perception that the drug was used primarily by people of color, i.e.,
African Americans and Mexicans was the catalyst that prompted and curried
support for criminalization.440 Hence, the motivation for criminalization
movements was racial and ethnic prejudice in southern and western states with
large Black and Mexican populations441 Marijuana was blamed for causing
murders, rapes, mayhem, the seduction of white girls by Black men, and
mayhem.442
When “Reefer Films” was released in 1936, most states in the country had
already outlawed marijuana.443 The film caricatured Black and Mexican people as
ax-wielding weed smokers.444 This image became the face of marijuana illegality,
wholly ignoring the widespread white use of the drug on college campuses.445 This
early work is the foundation for subsequent federal legislation that made minority
youth the “War on Drugs” targets and all of its antecedent evils.446 Today, the
minority of drug arrests are not the traffickers but the possessor of the substance.447
Although Black and Latino communities make up a smaller portion of the
American population, they are woefully overrepresented in drug arrests.448
Congress’s passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, banning all non-medical
use of the substance, led to these outcomes.449 Bender highlights that while most of
the focus of the negative impacts of marijuana drug arrests focuses on African
Americans, Latino communities are negatively affected because of the historical
narrative that connects them to the supply chain and production of the drug.450
Further, Latino immigrants face deportation; therefore, there is a dual consequence
for the historical stereotypes ascribed to this community.451
Isaac Campos challenges this construction of the racial motivation for
marijuana legislation.452 He argues that the argument of racial bias sits on “unstable
439
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ground” because it is supported by evidence that reflects little knowledge of
Mexicans.453 Specifically, Campos argues:
Recent research has since raised fresh doubts about the
paradigm, for it turns out that marijuana’s history in Mexico
runs counter to the notion that the drug was used widely and
casually by Mexican migrants. The most common stereotype
of the marijuana user in Mexico was that of a ferocious,
unpredictable, and therefore very dangerous madman.
Furthermore, marijuana use was not widespread among
Mexicans but, instead, mostly concentrated among prisoners
and soldiers. In short, marijuana’s history in Mexico is not
fully compatible with the story that has long been told about
Mexican immigrants and marijuana in the United States.454
Campos criticizes Musto and Bonnie, and Whitebread’s depictions of
Mexican use of marijuana to explain the criminalization movement in the U.S.455
However, Campos’s arguments seem to be narrowly tailored to the truth about
marijuana and Mexico and not related to the racial arguments made by Bonnie and
Whitebread to support the criminalization of marijuana in America.456
The harms of marijuana were also promoted by legislators, particularly by
Harry J. Anslinger, Commissioner of the Treasury Department’s Bureau of
Narcotics.457 An ambitious man, Anslinger used propaganda as a tool to further his
career. He relied on disinformation and used the media to legitimize his claims.458
Anslinger produced 15 propaganda articles.459 The best known was one in which
he described marijuana as “the assassin of youth” in a story of the same name about
a young man turned murderer while under the spell of Cannabis.460 Anslinger made
these claims without any scientific data to back up his assertions.461 The Marijuana
Stamp Act passed with very little opposition.462 Once marijuana is criminalized at
the deferral level, it lost its appeal to middle-class white communities who accepted
its characterization as a drug of minorities and the lower classes. 463 Anslinger’s
453
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activities reveal the true motivations for marijuana criminalization, “racist fears,
political ambitions, and an economic downturn.”464 Politically motivated
criminalization of the drug would later be connected to communism and socialism
in the McCarthy years.465 Valdez and Kaplan do not contest the role that Anslinger
played in demonizing communities to achieve his political objectives, but they warn
against too simplistic an argument.466 Instead, they posit background and
foreground factors influenced “both the social construction of the stigmatized
image of the Mexican as a marijuana user and the legitimation of a repressive
marijuana prohibition system.”467 They explained the background factors are the
historical use of marijuana in Mexico, immigration, racism, and the pharmamedical industry.468 The foreground factors are cultural stereotyping and the role
of the media, moral crusades and reform movements, and governmental
entrepreneurship.469 When these structures intersect, they create the stigma
associated with Mexican immigrants, which helps explain the continued
stigmatizing of minority groups today.
B. Modern Consequences of Criminalization
To gauge and discuss how current public opinion has influenced marijuana
policies in the most recent decade, we must begin by addressing the detrimental
effects that the War on Drugs --and the criminalization of marijuana specifically -has had on minority community members and mass incarceration. The Marijuana
Tax Act of 1937 was the legislation that criminalized marijuana; while this bill was
a critical factor in the development of mass incarceration, the 1970 Controlled
Substance Act solidified this link from marijuana possession to the prison
system.470 The 1970 Controlled Substance Act is the legislative bill that classified
marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance.471 This law allowed marijuana
possession to be treated as a felony and listed the drug as one with a high potential
for abuse with no medically accepted uses recognized by the United States
government.472 This act placed marijuana in the most heavily regulated category of
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drugs, with heroin and ecstasy.473 Marijuana is more regulated than Schedule II
substances, which include methamphetamine and various prescription opioid
medications.474 The nature of the laws surrounding marijuana combined with the
policing efforts allowed through the War on Drugs posed a significant barrier to the
advancement of minority groups toward equal rights and treatment.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the use of marijuana increased, specifically among
white middle-class youth, who still account for a significant portion of marijuana
users.475 Despite the substantial amount of marijuana consumed by the white
population, from the 1960s forward, “in 1990, the [B]lack arrest rates for marijuana
possession were about twice those for whites,” and by 2010, Black individuals were
3.5 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than white individuals,
although the rate of use of marijuana among the two groups is compatible.476
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Similar to the G.I. Bill and welfare benefits, marijuana legislation was race-neutral;
however, the application, administration, and enforcement of these anti-marijuana
policies are disproportionately imposed on Black people.477 While many cite the
difference between crack cocaine and cocaine policies to demonstrate the disparity
between white people and Black people in the crisis of mass incarceration, it is
essential to note that “by 2010, the heroin and crack cocaine arrests had fallen to
371,000” while 853,000 arrests were made for marijuana-related crimes.478 One of
the possible reasons for the spike in marijuana arrests since the 1980s could be the
stop and frisk policies employed by cities like New York.479 Black men and even
women are often more likely subjected to these policies.480 The disproportionality
in the application of drug crimes has led to the increased prison population and the
severe disparity between the population proportions of minority individuals in
prison compared to white individuals.481
Even if mass incarceration, in and of itself, did not disadvantage minority
communities enough, it is crucial to recognize the “collateral consequences” of
felony and sometimes even misdemeanor convictions.482 Collateral consequences
are various “civil legal constraints,” as well as social constraints, placed on an
individual who is identified as a convicted felon; often, these collateral
consequences are not endured until after one has completed their formal prison
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term.483 These collateral consequences can manifest in the form of “professional,
social, and personal barriers” to reintegration into the civilian community after
release.484 Prison can have long-lasting physical and psychological effects on an
individual; the first few months of an individual’s release from prison can be critical
to successful reentry into society.485 Suppose an individual finds they do not have
adequate resources or access to resources needed to survive and integrate back into
their community. In that case, they are likely to return to the practices that resulted
in their criminal conviction in the first place. These collateral consequences pose a
severe threat to former prisoners’ attempts to improve themselves and their lives
after prison.486 One of the most crucial barriers to this critical reintegration into
society is that convicted felons must disclose their criminal convictions when
applying for jobs.487 Employers are allowed to discriminate against convicted
felons in the job application process, preventing former prisoners from obtaining
the stability and financial opportunities provided by a job.488
Additionally, professional licensing organizations typically do not allow
individuals with a criminal record to participate in such organizations, severely
limiting employment options for convicted felons.489 Other collateral consequences
affect family and living situations. These include individuals with felony records
being denied custody of their children, criminal records preventing parents from
chaperoning on field trips, and limited housing options for these individuals, as
convicted criminals cannot reside in federally funded housing.490
Another significant collateral consequence that disproportionately impacts
racial and ethnic minority groups is deportation.491 Black immigrants and Latino
immigrants are the primary groups affected by the United States’ criminal
deportation policy.492 Since Latino immigrants and Black immigrants tend to reside
in the same communities as Black and Latino citizens, over-policing of drugs,
Id. at 416–19 (describing how criminal convictions “can restrict a person more than the direct
criminal law sentence” by preventing them “from fully engaging with their communities” through
both formal and informal means).
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specifically marijuana, affects the ability of these immigrants to incorporate
themselves into American society.493 While marijuana criminalization may have
been “couched in anti-immigrant sentiment under the guise of public safety and
protection of the youth,” over 80 years ago in 1937, the association of marijuana
with immigrants, primarily immigrants from Mexico, Jamaica, and the Dominican
Republic, demonstrate that these prejudices persist.494 This association of
marijuana prohibition with immigrants is akin to the association of opioid
consumption with immigrants in the early 20th century.495 Public and political
figures described immigrants as violent and lazy when consuming the drug.496
These stereotypical assignations directly impacted the narrative about immigration
to the United States. For example, one of Donald Trump's characterizations about
immigrants is that immigrants contribute to United States crime rates and the
importation and use of drugs, such as marijuana, to the United States. 497 Even if
Mexicans don’t casually use marijuana, it is assumed that they do, contributing to
the narrative of the modern moral entrepreneurs of that time, a description still used
by moral entrepreneurs like Jeff Sessions, Trump’s first United States Attorney.498
The continued stigmatization of marijuana and its association with
immigrants, almost solely from racial and ethnic minority groups, has thwarted
efforts to welcome immigrants.499 It also contributes to the deportation of
immigrants for criminal convictions.500 “Deportation is a consequence of violating
immigration laws.”501 “Working-class Black male deportees,” specifically
Jamaican and Dominican immigrants, “are often funneled first through the criminal
justice system rather than the immigration law enforcement apparatus.”502
Dominican and Jamaican male immigrants are especially vulnerable because they
are arrested at a disproportionate rate.503 Eighty-three percent of Jamaican and 78
percent of Dominican deportees were deported following a criminal conviction in
2005.504 These factors are present even when the public focus is not on Hispanic
immigrants.505 Moreover, Jamaican and Dominican immigrants experience similar
493

Id. at 137–38, 141, 153.
WHITE, supra note 86, at 76.
495
Id. at 388–89.
496
Ahrens, supra note 395, at 389.
497
DONALD F. KETTL, TRUMP'S WALL: THE BATTLE ON IMMIGRATION (2017).
498
See supra Section V(A).
499
See, e.g., Golash-Boza, supra note 475, at 153 (detailing research findings that the association
between Jamaicans and marijuana made Jamaican immigrants subject to arrest and feel that they
were being targeted and harassed by police due to their national origin).
500
Id. at 139; Ahrens, supra note 395, at 417 & n.185.
501
Golash-Boza, supra note 475, at 139.
502
Id.
503
Id. at 142–43.
504
Id. at 142.
505
Id. at 143.
494

- 69 -

prejudices that Black Americans face, along with the struggles they face as
immigrants; these intersectional issues result in added negative collateral
consequences.506
One of the most significant collateral consequences of criminal convictions
concerns the social stigma surrounding these individuals and the offenses they
committed.507 Criminals are often alienated from society, not just while serving
their prison sentences.508 Still, they are viewed and treated as the “other,” even after
paying their debt to society by doing prison time for their crimes. 509 The War on
Drugs acted as “both a popular metaphor and a mechanism for directly regulating”
minority and immigrant communities by associating drugs, and thus, crime as a
whole, with those communities, greatly influencing public opinion about crime and
criminal perpetrators.510
While public opinion has shifted drastically over the last several decades
from many Americans viewing substance use as immoral in 1937 to over 60 percent
of Americans supporting marijuana legalization in 2017, the federal government
has continued to advocate against marijuana decriminalization.511 Between 2001
and 2008, the Office of National Drug Control Policy argued that marijuana is a
dangerous drug through official publications.512 In the early years of advocacy for
marijuana criminalization, Harry Anslinger claimed that marijuana caused crime
and insanity, but as the counter-culture of the 1960s grew (and marijuana was
commonly consumed by white people), this narrative was challenging to support
scientifically.513 While there is scant evidence supporting the claims of
dangerousness, many individuals, especially older white people, insist that
marijuana is a dangerous drug only consumed by the lowest dregs of society.514
These criticisms did not stop the drug from transitioning to a soft recreational drug
as middle-class white communities began widespread use of marijuana.515 The
growing use of marijuana by white people has shifted public opinion resulting in
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“skyrocketing support for legalization.”516 The increased public support for
marijuana has grown throughout the United States, reflecting the broad popular
support for decriminalizing the drug.517
Not only has public support for marijuana legalization significantly
increased in the past 30 years, but many states have either decriminalized or even
legalized the drug for medical use only or both medical and recreational use. As of
2015, “23 states and Washington D.C.” have adopted such policies, and, by 2020,
even more states did so.518 However, it is essential to note that the legalization and
decriminalization of recreational marijuana often follow the legal allowance of
medical marijuana.519 The potential uses of medical marijuana have been a
significant driver for decriminalization.520 Fifteen years after states began allowing
the use of medical marijuana, states have finally started decriminalizing and
legalizing the drug for recreational use.521 Medical cannabis can be expensive; thus,
medical marijuana has been used mainly by white people.522 This factor may help
explain the growth in favorable public opinion about all drug uses, separating the
drug’s benefits from the historical association with minority groups.523 As
marijuana continues to be decriminalized by states, it is important to recognize that
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different policies, typically unique to each jurisdiction, can have disproportionate
effects on those who choose to use the drug.524
Marijuana decriminalization, or even legalization, does not dissolve all
marijuana-related arrests. Even in states that have legalized marijuana, minority
communities are still facing obstacles and discrimination because of marijuana
convictions.525 First, the barriers to entry in the legal marijuana market are difficult
to overcome.526 The cultivators and sellers of legal marijuana face strict regulator
mandates, which impact the capacity of minority groups to participate in a costly
business model.527 Due to these factors, the cannabis industry is composed of a
majority white population.528 Hence, the groups historically disadvantaged by
marijuana criminalization are left out of the economic benefits of the drug’s
legalization.529 Even in states with legal marijuana, arrests of sellers and users track
historical racial and ethnic patterns of disproportionality.530 This continued
disenfranchisement of racial and ethnic minorities through marijuana policies
demonstrates the role that public opinion has played in the history, and progression,
of marijuana laws.
Researchers have consistently found that two of the most significant reasons
for support of marijuana decriminalization center around the potential benefits of
medical marijuana and the economic potential for state and federal tax revenue the
drug has.531 It is essential to recognize that the public opinion in support of
marijuana legalization is not usually framing the issue from the standpoint of social
justice and improving the status of minority groups, and solving the mass
incarceration problem. However, it is an active consideration of many marijuana
advocates.532 A chief concern is that the failure to implement aggressive programs
524
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to end confinement for the drug war victims will create significant risk—especially
where the general public does not seem nearly as concerned with this consequence
of marijuana policy.533 However, a current marijuana bill that the United States
House of Representatives passed does include expungement of all previous
marijuana possession convictions for individuals who have violated marijuana
laws.534 This bill is a necessity for federal marijuana legislation if minority
communities are going to have the potential to benefit from marijuana
legalization.535 It is essential to note that public opinion in favor of marijuana
legalization has continued to improve after states have legalized the drug and
witnessed positive results.536 The drug continues to be popular and beneficial for
white users.537
Since the criminalization of marijuana in 1937, public opinion on marijuana
has shifted over time.538 When marijuana first became restricted, enforcement
targeted the importation and sale of the drug, not its use.539 Marijuana increasingly
became associated with racial and ethnic minorities, thus shrouding marijuana in
racism and nativism.540 Subsequent laws reflected the negative and stereotypical
prejudices targeting immigrants and minorities by the dominant cultural groups.541
This linkage of marijuana with disfavored social groups inspired sanctions targeting
these communities.542 Influenced by the moral and racial panic surrounding
marijuana, public opinion on marijuana changed.543 Individuals became afraid of
the drug itself and those perceived to use it the most, racial and ethnic minority
groups.544 In the 1970s, the drug became associated with the counter-culture
movement while simultaneously maintaining its association with minority
risk is “that legalization of marijuana will mean that a few White men . . . will make a lot of money
on cannabis cultivation and sales, while many Black men . . . will remain behind bars or carry felony
drug convictions forward.” Chapkis, supra note 524, at 18.
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groups.545 This shift left public opinion unchanged; however, as white use of
marijuana became more prevalent and normalized, the public became much more
accepting of marijuana, which has remained consistent to the present day.546 Even
as marijuana use has become more widely accepted by the American people and
even legalized or decriminalized in much of the United States, minorities have
continued to be disadvantaged by the policies surrounding marijuana.547 While
public opinion may not have led to the criminalization of marijuana, it significantly
affected the drug’s decriminalization. The acceptance of marijuana in mainstream
American culture will be necessary for the continued development of marijuana
policy. Still, the public mustn’t continue to leave minority groups behind in these
efforts.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The French Annale School challenges historians to engage in longue durée
study of history; in other words, to understand the contemporary context of a
condition in society, we must examine long-term historical structures that create
our current environments.548 With this approach, the historian recreates the past
world, not just a sequence of events, to extrapolate a range of permanent data that
explains the scale of choices and opportunities offered to people.549 This approach
helps to explain how the historical pattern of criminalizing minority communities
for drugs used as frequently or more often in white society leads to social and justice
inequalities for citizens and communities of color.550 Scholars who examine the
racial motivations for criminalizing certain drugs or how minority communities
consume those drugs tend to evaluate these movements as events isolated to that
historical period. We must widen our lens to discern why the pattern recreates itself
over the long course of American history. Failure to do this means that we do not
view these activities as symptomatic of societal and governmental structures that
have existed for more than a century. Historical context helps to explain that the
current criminalization of cocaine versus crack versus methamphetamine is a longterm project of a hegemonic state to engage in paternalism, stereotyping, or
propaganda to advance social, political, or personal interests. If these factors are
studied and explained, society can better understand these motivations and push
back.
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In her article “Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline,
and Transformation in Postwar American History,” Heather Thompson posits that
America must reckon with a history that leads to the over-incarceration of minority
communities.551 In support, she raises an unsettling statistic that America
incarcerated more people between 1990 and 1999 than were killed in the Vietnam
War.552 Thompson explains that the overcriminalization of urban spaces occurs
even in the face of data that shows that these spaces are not where drug crimes
occur.553 We have to be vigilant when actors engineer a perception of public danger
in disadvantaged communities or communities of color that vastly misstates real
risk to create a politically resonant “moral panic.” Overwhelming data and
scholarship from the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries show that
Chinese, Mexican, and African Americans were unfortunate proxies in a drug war
that had very little to do with addiction, violence, rape, prostitution, or urban decay.
Yet, the impact of sustained criminalization campaigns wreaks havoc on these
targeted communities’ social and economic well-being.
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